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of Supervisors, Pima County v. Robinson 48 declared unconstitutional
a requirement providing for one year residence before being entitled
to nonemergency public medical care. Again following Shapiro,
Alvarez v. Hackney,49 a Texas case, granted retroactive benefits to
indigents.
As a result of Shapiro, the residence requirements under article
695c 5 ° of the Texas Public Welfare Act must be declared unconstitutional.
The Court has spoken. But on what basis may the more fundamental
rights such as voting be impeded by residence requirements of any
type? Has the proverbial door been opened?"' Shapiro has been a
definite step-but in which direction and to what end is yet to be
determined.
Angelo P. Parker
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IMMUNITY DOES NOT BAR THE SUIT OF A PAYING PATIENT SEEKING
To RECOVER DAMAGES SUSTAINED As A RESULT OF NEGLIGENCE ON
THE PART OF AN AGENT, SERVANT OR EMPLOYEE OF A CHARITABLE
HOSPITAL. Villarreal v. Santa Rosa Medical Center, 443 S.W.2d 622

(Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1969, no writ).

Plaintiff, a paying patient admitted for surgery, brought an action
against charitable hospital for damages allegedly sustained as a result
of the negligence of the agents, servants or employees of the hospital
in administering a transfusion of adulterated blood. As a result thereof,
plaintiff became infected with serum hepatitis. The trial court entered
a take nothing summary judgment based solely upon the hospital's

defense of charitable immunity. Held-Reversed and remanded. The
doctrine of charitable immunity does not bar the suit of a paying patient

seeking to recover damages sustained as a result of negligence on the
part of an agent, servant, or employee of a charitable hospital.
Generally, persons are liable for tortious conduct; immunity is the
exception. Under the doctrine of respondeat superior,persons and busiDespite our inclination to uphold, if free to do so, the constitutionality of the West
Virginia statutes and regulations here involved, we are compelled to follow and apply
the determinations and pronouncements of the highest Court in the land. The Court
has spoken.
48 457 P.2d 951 (Ariz. App. 1969).
49 Civil No. 68-18-SA (W.D. Tex.). (Order entered on Sept. 30, 1969; Stipulations and
Agreements, Oct. 11, 1969).
50 TEx. REv.Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 695(c) as amended (1967).
51 See Kirk v. Board of Regents of Univ. of California, 78 Cal. Rptr. 260 (Cal. App. 1969).
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ness corporations respond for damage inflicted by the negligence of
their agents and employees.' The doctrine of respondeat superior is
essentially a policy doctrine, and the master will generally be liable
for the torts of his servant committed in the scope of the servant's
employment. 2 Thus, the rule of nonliability of a charity is an exception
8
to the respondeat superior doctrine.
The doctrine of charitable immunity was apparently first recognized
in the United States in 1876 in the McDonald v. Massachusetts General
Hospita4 decision that held charitable corporations immune from tort
liability. In holding such a corporation immune, the court followed the
rule of an 1861 English case, Holliday v. St. Leonard," apparently not
knowing it had already been overruled by Foreman v. Mayor of Canterbury.6
Charitable immunity has long been recognized in Texas,7 but it is
not complete immunity. 8 The leading case in this state on the doctrine
of charitable immunity is Southern Methodist University v. Clayton
decided by the Texas Supreme Court in 1943.9 This opinion limited
and clarified the theretofore uncertain scope of the doctrine. In Clayton the court held that a charitable organization is liable to an employee for injuries proximately caused by the negligence of its officers,
vice-principals or agents. 10 However, such organizations are not liable
for injuries to others, be they beneficiaries, invitees or strangers," in
the absence of proof of negligence on the part of the charity in employing or keeping the agent whose negligence proximately caused the
injuries. 12 This principle has been applied in several cases in which the
1President and Directors of Georgetown College v. Hughes, 130 F.2d 810 (D.C. Cir.
1942).
2 Newspapers Inc. v. Love, 380 S.W.2d 582 (Tex. Sup. 1964); Galveston, H. & S.A. Ry.
Co. v. Henefy, 99 S.W. 884 (Tex. Civ. App. 1907, no writ).
3J. Weingarten, Inc. v. Sanchez, 228 S.W.2d 303 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1950, no
writ).
4 120 Mass. 432 (1876).
5 11 C.B. (N.S.) 192 (1861).
6 L.R. 6 Q.B. 214 (1871).
7 A nonprofit hospital department maintained by railway company for its sick and
wounded employees cannot be held liable for the negligence of the physicians it furnishes,
except upon the ground of want of proper care in their selection or retention. Galveston,
H. & S.A. Ry. v. Hanway, 57 S.W. 695 (Tex. Civ. App. 1900, writ dism'd w.o.j.).
8 ".. . the rule here is that such (charitable) institutions, with respect to patients within
their walls or under their care, whether the patient be one on charity or one who pays,
are liable for the negligence of their physicians, nurses and servants only when it appears
that ordinary care has not been exercised in their selection and retention; and that, with
respect to injuries inflicted upon third persons and employees of the institution, they
come entirely within the rule of respondeatsuperior." St. Paul's Sanitarium v. Williamson,
164 S.W. 36, 39 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1914, writ ref'd).
9 142 Tex. 179, 176 S.W.2d 749 (1943).
10 Hotel Dieu v. Armendarez, 210 S.W. 518 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1919, jdgmt adopted);
Armendarez v. Hotel Dieu, 145 S.W. 1030 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1912, no writ).
11 Southern Methodist University v. Clayton, 142 Tex. 179, 176 S.W.2d 749 (1943).
12 St. Paul's Sanitarium v. Williamson,. 164 S.W. 36 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1914, writ
ref'd).
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alleged negligence of a nurse caused injury to a patient."3
In cases subsequent to Clayton, two further refinements have been
placed on the doctrine: (1) the charity is liable to the injured party if,
through negligence, improper equipment for treatment or service is
provided and causes an injury, 14 and (2) the purchase of liability insurance does not act as a waiver of immunity15
"Some twenty-five states have now abrogated the doctrine."' 6 In
recent years, when the issue has come before a court as a matter of first
impression, the doctrine has been consistently rejected.' 7 Although not
the first case in which the immunity doctrine was discarded, President
and Directors of Georgetown College v. Hughes1 appears to be the
most cited in expressing the reasons for the doctrine's loss of utility:
The rule of immunity is out of step with the general trend of
legislative and judicial policy in distributing losses incurred by
individuals through the operation of an enterprise among all
who benefit by it rather than in leaving them wholly to be borne
by those who sustain them. 19
Texas courts have justified the doctrine on the grounds of public
policy, 20 apparently with the underlying rationale that one should not
bite the hand that feeds him. Both the doctrine of respondeat superior
and its exception, the doctrine of charitable immunity, are based on
public policy; the court in Clayton weighed the public policy considerations and determined that the benefits derived by the public
from charities outweighed the individual loss that might be incurred
by an injured person deprived of recourse for a tortious act. 21 The

economic reasons existing at the time of Clayton are not prevalent
today. Many modern charities are large business corporations with
vast assets. The ready availability of liability insurance, the cost of
which may be borne by all the recipients of the institutions' services
or facilities, could provide the needed protection against liability. It is
13 Steele v. St. Joseph's Hospital, 60 S.W.2d 1083 (Tex. Civ. App.-Ft. Worth 1933, writ
ref'd); Enell v. Baptist Hospital, 45 S.W.2d 395 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1932, writ
ref'd); Baylor University v. Boyd, 18 S.W.2d 700 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1929, no writ);
Barnes v. Providence Sanitarium, 229 S.W. 588 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1921, writ
dism'd); St. Paul's Sanitarium v. Williamson, 164 S.W. 36 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1914,
writ ref'd).
14 Baptist Memorial Hospital v. Marrable, 244 S.W.2d 567 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio
1951, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
15 Baptist Memorial Hospital v. McTighe, 303 S.W.2d 446 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso
1957, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
16 Villarreal v. Santa Rosa Medical Center, 443 S.W.2d 622 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1969, no writ).
17 Id.; see Annot., 25 A.L.R.2d 29 (1952).
18 130 F.2d 810 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
19 Id. at 827.
20 Southern Methodist University v. Clayton, 142 Tex. 179, 176 S.W.2d 749 (1943).
21 Id.
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more realistic to denominate most of the institutions "non-profit"
' ' 22
rather than "charitable.
It is difficult, for example, to consider a person who pays from
$20 to $50 per day for a hospital room to be the object of charity
and entitled to no protection from negligent acts of the employees ....23
In 1966, the Texas Supreme Court had an opportunity to review
the doctrine in light of modern conditions. In Watkins v. Southcrest
Baptist Church,24 the court reaffirmed the doctrine, but rather than
justify the holding on the basis of public policy, as had been done in
past decisions, charitable immunity was upheld because charities had
come to rely on Clayton and had not taken steps to protect themselves
against prosecution. The opinion indicated that if changed conditions
demanded abolition, such should be effected by the legislature, not
the judiciary.
Notwithstanding the decision, the court was divided in such a manner as to cast a degree of doubt as to how it would deal with the question
if it were to arise again. A summary of the individual opinions set out
in Watkins is helpful in attempting to understand the decision in the
Villarreal case. Justices Griffin, Hamilton, and Pope joined in the
majority opinion written by Justice Norvell. It should be noted that
this opinion was not so much an approval of the doctrine of charitable
immunity as it was of the doctrine of stare decisis.
Justice Walker concurred in the affirmance, but said that he would
announce that the doctrine would not be recognized in cases arising
25
thereafter.
Justice Greenhill, concurring, believed that the court should declare
that in cases arising after the decision became final, the court would
feel free to re-examine the doctrine, and that Watkins should serve as
a caveat to people and institutions. 26 Justice Steakley joined in this
opinion.
22 For a well-reasoned and well-documented discussion of why charitable immunity
should be re-evaluated in Texas, see Conners, Charity Begins at Home, 3 S. TEX. L.J. 225
(1958); contra, Sister Ann Joachim, Immunity Doctrine in the South West, 4 S. TEX. L.J.
232 (1959).
23 Justice Greenhill's concurring opinion, Watkins v. Southcrest Baptist Church, 399
S.W.2d 530 (Tex. Sup. 1966).
24 399 S.W.2d 530 (Tex. Sup. 1966).
25 Justice Walker apparently would apply the procedure for overruling termed the
"Sunburst" doctrine, which was held constitutional in Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Sunburst
Oil & Refining Co., 287 U.S. 358, 53 S.Ct. 145, 77 L. Ed. 360 (1932). Under the "Sunburst"
doctrine, precedent would be adhered to in the particular case, but the court would dogmatically announce that the rule will be different hereafter, and state what the new holding shall be.
26 Justice Greenhill states that he is impressed with arguments that the doctrine of charitable immunity may now be unsound, but he feels it proper to give some warning that
precedent may be reconsidered. The procedure for overruling that he favors does not go
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Chief Justice Calvert, joined by Justice Smith, felt the doctrine
should be abolished instanter without distinction as to the nature or
character of the various charitable organizations.
There were, then, four opinions written in Watkins and only four
justices upheld Clayton. In view of these opinions and the subsequent
change in the personnel on the court, 2 it may well be that the court
would hold differently were the question before it today.
Under Watkins, as interpreted by the San Antonio Court of Civil
Appeals, 28 Texas courts are no longer bound by the Clayton rule if the
cause of action arose subsequent to the finality of the Watkins decision.
It is our duty as an intermediate court, in our judicial system,
to follow the decision of our Supreme Court. (Omitting citation)
Clearly, this would be our duty if a majority of the members of
the Supreme Court in Watkins had29 followed or reaffirmed the
Clayton rule of charitable immunity.
If this is the true intention of the Watkins decision, then this court
is merely adhering to the doctrine of stare decisis. For this writer to
presuppose whether other courts of civil appeals will interpret the
intent of the supreme court in the same manner would be mere
conjecture.8 0
The immunity applies to all the various types of charitable organizations in the state. The possibility of a doctrinal checkerboard arising in
Texas presents itself. With the doctrine not entirely abrogated and
under decisions and interpretations of the several courts, some Texas
courts may give immunity to churches and not to hospitals, 3 1 others
nearly so far as the "Sunburst" doctrine in that he does not announce what the new holding would be, but merely that he would not be bound by precedent upon re-examination.
Because he would not overrule the doctrine completely, as would Justice Walker and the
dissenting Justices, it may be fairly implied that he feels it has merit in some circumstances
and would only overrule it in the situation when changed conditions would warrant it.
27 Justices Norvel1 and Griffin are no longer on the court, having been replaced by Justices McGee and Reavley.
28 Villarreal v. Santa Rosa Medical Center, 443 S.W.2d 622 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1969, no writ).
29 Id.
80 The Amarillo Court of Civil Appeals feels that either the supreme court or the legislature can change the doctrine of charitable immunity, but that an intermediate appellate
court cannot. As to the Watkins decision, the court feels it is obligated to follow the majority of the divided supreme court. Tunnell v. Otis Elevator Company, 400 S.W.2d 781
(Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1965, writ ref'd n.r.e.); referring to Watkins, ".. . it is indicated
that the court may hereafter abolish the doctrine, but until then, following the majority
in Watkins, we hold that appellee in this case (charitable hospital) is immune . . ."
Dillon v. Greenville Hospital Authority, 404 S.W.2d 956 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1966, no
writ).
81 "There is an obvious distinction between a church on one hand and a hospital on the
other. Churches are largely dependent upon volunteer help to carry on many of their
functions. Actually, the church or its vice principals are not positioned to exercise an
effective control over those who carry out the details incident to the major portion of the
church's works and ministry," Watkins v. Southcrest Baptist Church, 399 S.W.2d 530, 533
(Tex. Sup. 1966).
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